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ABSTRACT
Insecure connected devices can cause serious threats not just to
smart home-owners, but also the underlying infrastructural
network. There has been increasing academic and regulatory
interest in addressing cybersecurity risks from both the standpoint
of IoT vendors and that of end-users. In addition to the current data
protection and network security legal frameworks, for example, the
UK government has initiated the ‘Secure by Design’ campaign.
While there has been work on how organisations and individuals
manage their own cybersecurity risks, it remains unclear to what
extent IoT vendors are supporting end-users to perform day-to-day
management of such risks, and what is stopping the vendors from
improving such support. We interviewed 13 experts in the field of
IoT and identified three main categories of barriers to making IoT
products useably secure: technical, legal and organisational. In this
paper we further discuss the policymaking implications of these








The security of smart home products has been an increasing concern for consumers and
policymakers alike. As the number of smart devices connected to the Internet of Things
(IoT) is growing steadily, more cybersecurity incidents associated with smart devices
are being reported. In theory vendors of IoT products would have incentives to ensure
their products are safe to use ‘out of the box’ and also provide help for consumers to
manage their smart home security across the life cycle of the technologies. In reality,
however, this is not taking place at a satisfactory level, and the resulting legislative
shifts are changing the regulatory landscape in the UK and EU. Our investigation
unpacks the socio-technical causes of poor smart device cybersecurity, criticises the
current regulatory frameworks and explores alternative approaches to improving the
state of this domain. We interviewed 13 experts from different sectors all of whom had
significant experience in the area of IoT security. In this article, we will first provide
some background information about the regulatory landscape in this field as well as an
explanation as to why this inquiry is important at this time, as governance of smart
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homes and cybersecurity is changing. The design and results of our study will then be pre-
sented, before we further discuss how such insights can help us make sense of the tech-
nical, legal and organisational barriers that the industry is facing, and also the regulatory
support that might be needed to tackle these barriers.
2. Context and motivation
2.1 The popularity of smart home products and the rise of associated
cybersecurity threats
Consumer IoT is a fast-growing industry both in the UK and worldwide. The global smart
home market was valued at $43.4bn in 2017 and estimated to more than double at
$91bn for 2020.1 In the UK, the smart device market has seen a strong growth as well. A
2020 report showed that the market penetration of smart speakers had grown from 7%
in 2017 to 29% in 2020, and smart TVs also saw a growth from 39% to 49% for the same
period.2
The growth of spending on smart devices in 2020 has been affected by the COVID-19
pandemic, due to economic uncertainties, restricted retail opportunities, and disrupted
manufacturing and distribution.3 In the long term, however, it is believed that the pan-
demic will further accelerate the adoption of smart home products for various reasons,
including the dramatic increase in time spent at home and the higher demands in track-
ing health and fitness.4
Concurrently, the sheer increased number of connected devices raises concerns
about the heightened cybersecurity risks. Vulnerable smart devices without security pro-
visions may become targets of cyberattacks, which pose threats not just to the end-user’s
security and privacy,5 but also to the operation of the infrastructural network. There is a
concern around the scale of cybersecurity attacks. Whilst local smart home cybersecurity
risks can directly impact physical or informational security of home occupants, there is
scope for these risks to scale up. For example, if a zero-day vulnerability exists across
IoT devices installed in thousands of homes, there could be wide-scale disruption and
danger. Since the Mirai DDoS attack began in 2016, there have been continual
waves of botnet attacks exploiting vulnerable IoT devices. In 2020 alone, security
researchers have identified multiple botnet variants, such as Hoaxcalls,6 Dark_nexus7
1Alara Basul, ‘Global smart home market to reach 158bn by 2024’ (2020) <https://www.uktech.news/news/global-smart-
home-market-to-hit-%24158-billion-value-by-2024-20200203> accessed 10 May 2021.
2TechUK, ‘The State of the Connected Home 2020 Report | Edition 4’ (2020) <https://www.techuk.org/resource/the-state-
of-the-connected-home-2020-report-edition-4.html> accessed 10 May 2021.
3ABI Research, ‘COVID-19 Cuts Smart Home Growth by US$14 Billion in 2020, But Drives Future Change’ (2020) <https://
www.prnewswire.co.uk/news-releases/covid-19-cuts-smart-home-growth-by-us-14-billion-in-2020-but-drives-future-
change-833081672.html> accessed 10 May 2021.
4Deloitte, ‘The connected home: Just getting started’ (2021) <https://www2.deloitte.com/uk/en/pages/technology-
media-and-telecommunications/articles/the-connected-home-just-getting-started.html> accessed 10 May 2021.
5Mark Ward, ‘How to hack and crack the connected home’ (2014) <https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/technology-27373328>
accessed 10 May 2021; BBC, ‘Smart doorbells ’easy target for hackers’ study finds’ (2020) <https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/
technology-55044568> accessed 10 May 2021; BBC, ‘Smart camera and baby monitor warning given by UK’s cyber-
defender’ (2020) <https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/technology-51706631> accessed 10 May 2021.
6Ionut Arghire, ‘Hoaxcalls Botnet Expands Targets List, DDoS Capabilities’ (2020) <https://www.securityweek.com/
hoaxcalls-botnet-expands-targets-list-ddos-capabilities> accessed 10 May 2021.
7Charlie Osborne, ‘Dark_nexus botnet outstrips other malware with new, potent features’ (2020) <https://www.zdnet.
com/article/new-dark-nexus-botnet-outstrips-others-with-original-advanced-capabilities/> accessed 10 May 2021.
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and Mukashi.8 If a large number of IoT devices become compromised, they can be weap-
onised against critical facilities, including healthcare services9 and power grids.10 Threats
to smart home devices can take a variety of forms. Bernard-Wills et al. have identified 9
main categories of threats,11 while Malan et al. have identified 13.12 A recent report
finds that IoT-based DDoS attacks have been intensified during the current pandemic,
as more devices have been connected to the network and organisations have struggled
to maintain the workforce.13
2.2. The ‘Secure by design’ initiative and the broader regulatory context
In the light of the ongoing cybersecurity threats associated with vulnerable consumer IoT
products, the UK government published the Secure by Design report in 2018, which calls
for ‘a fundamental shift in approach to moving the burden away from consumers having
to secure their internet connected devices and instead to ensure strong cyber security is
built into consumer IoT products and associated services by design’.14 The report pro-
posed a Code of Practice for Security in Consumer IoT Products and Associated Services,
which was adopted later that year with a shorter title of ‘Code of Practice for Consumer
IoT Security’.15 The Code contains 13 guidelines, which include:
. ‘no default passwords’,
. ‘implement a vulnerability disclosure policy’,
. ‘keep software updated’,
. ‘securely store credentials and security sensitive data’,
. ‘communicate securely’,
. ‘minimise exposed attack surfaces’,
. ‘ensure software integrity’,
. ‘ensure that personal data is protected’,
8Ravie Lakshmanan, ‘Mukashi: A New Mirai IoT Botnet Variant Targeting Zyxel NAS Devices’ (2020) <https://
thehackernews.com/2020/03/zyxel-mukashi-mirai-iot-botnet.html> accessed 10 May 2021.
9Mike Miliard, ‘Massive DDoS attack harnesses 145,000 hacked IoT devices’ (2016) <https://www.healthcareitnews.com/
news/massive-ddos-attack-harnesses-145000-hacked-iot-devices> accessed 10 May 2021.
10Jack Malan and others, ‘Framing the Nature and Scale of Cyber Security Vulnerabilities within the Current Consumer
Internet of Things (IoT) Landscape’ (2020) <https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/
uploads/attachment_data/file/900327/Framing_the_nature_and_scale_of_cyber_security_vulnerabilities_within_
the_current_consumer_internet_of_things__IoT__landscape.pdf> accessed 10 May 2020.
11David Barnard-Wills, Louus Marinos and Silvia Portesi, ‘Threat Landscape and Good Practice Guide for Smart Home and
Converged Media’ (2014) <https://www.enisa.europa.eu/publications/threat-landscape-for-smart-home-and-media-
convergence/at_download/fullReport> accessed 10 May 2021. The 9 categories include “Legal”, “Nefarious Activity/
Abuse”, “Eavesdropping/Interception/Hijacking”, “Outages”, “Physical attacks”, “Unintentional damages (accidental)”,
“Disasters” and “Damage/Loss (IT Assets)”.
12Malan and others (n 10). The 13 categories include “Physical attacks”, “Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS)”, “Uninten-
tional damage (accidental)”, “Failure/malfunctions”, “Outages”, “Eavesdropping/interception/hijacking”, “nefarious
activity”, “Spoofing”, “Tampering”, “Repudiation of actions”, “Information disclosure”, “Elevation of privilege” and
“Unsupported endpoint management”.
13Alicia Hope, ‘DDoS Attacks Increased Rapidly During the COVID-19 Pandemic as Hackers Exploited New Tools and Tech-
niques’ (2021) <https://www.cpomagazine.com/cyber-security/ddos-attacks-increased-rapidly-during-the-covid-19-
pandemic-as-hackers-exploited-new-tools-and-techniques/> accessed 10 May 2021.
14DCMS, ‘Secure by Design: Improving the cyber security of consumer Internet of Things Report’ (2018) <https://assets.
publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/973926/Secure_by_Design_
Report__V2.pdf> accessed 10 May 2021.
15DCMS, ‘Code of Practice for Consumer IoT Security’ (2018) <https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/code-of-
practice-for-consumer-iot-security> accessed 10 May 2021.
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. ‘make systems resilient to outages’,
. ‘monitor system telemetry data’,
. ‘make it easy for consumers to delete personal data’,
. ‘make installation and maintenance of devices easy’ and
. ‘validate input data’.
It should however be noted that all these guidelines are currently provided as ‘good
practice’ but not mandatory. Whether and how they should be mandated in the legis-
lation is a separate issue that we will discuss below.
Inorder to set out the statutory, baseline security requirements for consumer IoTproducts,
the government launched a public consultation on its regulatory proposals in 2019.16 The
consultation set out three main regulatory options, which can be summarised as:
. ‘mandating a security label’ (the government’s preferred option),
. ‘mandating the top 3 guidelines’ (i.e. ‘no default passwords’, ‘implement a vulnerability
disclosure policy’ and ‘keep software updated’), and
. ‘mandating all 13 guidelines’.
After the consultation, an updated version of the regulatory proposals was published
in 2020, which essentially shifted the preferred regulatory option to the second one, i.e.
mandating the top 3 guidelines set out in the Code of Practice as the baseline require-
ments.17 In April 2021, the government responded to the consultation,18 confirming
they will proceed with UK wide legislation and establish an enforcement body that will
ensure protection for consumers from insecure connected consumer products including
smart speakers, televisions, doorbells and phones (but not desktops or laptop computers).
The Queen’s Speech 2021 tabled the Product Security and Telecommunications Infra-
structure Bill, signalling the start of the legislative process.19
Furthermore, whilst the UK Cybersecurity Strategy continues beyond 2021, it remains
unclear when the current Strategy ends. A progress report from 2020 highlights that
making technology secure by design, particularly for consumer IoT, has been a key pri-
ority. They state ‘A core tenet of the regulatory approach is to implement transparency
between those who make, stock and sell IoT devices’ and they will push for legislation
by the end of the Strategy, alongside supporting international standard development,
like the success of ETSI EN 303 645.20 Parallel developments are taking place in the EU,
16DCMS, ‘Consultation on the Government’s regulatory proposals regarding consumer Internet of Things (IoT) security’ (2019)
<https://www.gov.uk/government/consultations/consultation-on-regulatory-proposals-on-consumer-iot-security/consulta
tion-on-the-governments-regulatory-proposals-regarding-consumer-internet-of-things-iot-security> accessed 10 May 2021.
17DCMS, ‘Proposals for regulating consumer smart product cyber security - call for views’ (2020) <https://www.gov.uk/
government/publications/proposals-for-regulating-consumer-smart-product-cyber-security-call-for-views/proposals-
for-regulating-consumer-smart-product-cyber-security-call-for-views> accessed 10 May 2021.
18DCMS(2021) <https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/regulating-consumer-smart-product-cyber-security-
government-response/government-response-to-the-call-for-views-on-consumer-connected-product-cyber-security-
legislation> accessed 10 May 2021.
19Peter Ray Allison, ‘What the Telecommunications (Security) Bill means for UK industry’ Computer Weekly (2 June 2021)
<https://www.computerweekly.com/feature/What-the-Telecommunications-Security-Bill-means-for-UK-industry>
accessed 8 June 2021.
20Cabinet Office, ‘National Cyber Security Strategy 2016 - 2021’ (2020) <https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/
government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/937702/6.6788_CO_National-Cyber-Security-Strategy-
2016-2021_WEB3.pdf> accessed 10 May 2021.
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where there have been discussions on regulating connected devices either through a new
legislative framework21 or by reforming the Radio Equipment Directive,22 but no formal
proposal has been tabled yet. The recent proposal on regulating AI systems23 may also
be relevant given that AI solutions are increasingly applied to IoT systems, and that the
draft has a relatively broad definition of ‘operators’ of AI systems.
The government’s regulatory initiative should be viewed against the backdrop of the
broader cybersecurity and data protection legislation, as well as the associated standard-
isation efforts. In relation to cybersecurity law, the EU’s Directive on Security of Network
and Information Systems (NIS Directive)24 was adopted and entered into force in 2016,
which was implemented in the UK through the Network and Information Systems Regu-
lations 2018 (NIS Regulations).25 We discuss proposed NIS reforms below, but the
current NIS legal framework sets out the criteria for the identification of operators of
essential services. This covers the energy, transport, banking, financial market infrastruc-
tures, health, drinking water and digital infrastructures sectors, as well as the key digital
services, i.e. online marketplace, online search engine and cloud computing services. It
also lays down the minimum security and incident notification requirements, and the out-
lines the role and cooperative mechanisms of national competent authorities and inci-
dent response teams. Manufacturers, retailers and service providers of consumer IoT
products are not typically subject to the NIS framework, but if an attack causes disruptions
to an essential sector or a key digital service, the contingency measures set out in the
legislation should be put in place. It is a different question whether the IoT sector
ought to be covered by the NIS framework (or at least the key players in the sector),
given the serious impact of connected devices on the security of the wider network, a
topic we will discuss later.
In terms of data protection law, the EU’s General Data Protection Regulation26 may
come into play to the extent that personal data is involved in the use of consumer IoT
devices. Article 5(1)(f) speaks of the principle of ‘integrity and confidentiality’, requiring
‘appropriate security of the personal data, including protection against unauthorised or
unlawful processing and against accidental loss, destruction or damage, using appropri-
ate technical or organisational measures’. In addition, Article 25(1) imposes a ‘data protec-
tion by design and by default’ requirement on data controllers, who are required to ‘both
at the time of the determination of the means for processing and at the time of the
21ZVEI, ‘Horizontal Product Regulation for Cybersecurity’ (2018) <https://www.zvei.org/fileadmin/user_upload/Presse_
und_Medien/Publikationen/2018/November/Horizontale_Produktregulierung_fuer_Cybersicherheit_Whitepaper/
ZVEI-Whitepaper_Horizontal_Product_Regulation_for_Cybersecurity_english.pdf> accessed 10 May 2021; DIGITALEU-
ROPE, ‘Defining the way forward for IoT security and certification schemes’ (2019) <https://www.digitaleurope.org/wp/
wp-content/uploads/2019/10/Position-on-IoT-security-and-certification-schemes-FINAL-FOR-APPROVAL.pdf> accessed
10 May 2021.
22BEUC, ‘Keeping Consumers Secure: How to tackle cybersecurity threats through EU law’ (2019) <https://www.beuc.eu/
publications/beuc-x-2019-066_keeping_consumers_secure_-_how_to_tackle_cybersecurity_threats_through_eu_
law.pdf> accessed 10 May 2021.
23Commission (EC), ‘Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council laying down harmonised
rules on artificial intelligence (Artificial Intelligence Act) and amending certain Union legislative acts’ COM (2021) 206
final, 21 April 2021.
24Directive (EU) 2016/1148 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 6 July 2016 concerning measures for a high
common level of security of network and information systems across the Union [2016] OJ L 194/1 (‘NIS Directive’).
25The Network and Information Systems Regulations 2018 SI 2018/506.
26Regulation (EU) 2016/679 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 April 2016 on the protection of natural
persons with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data, and repealing Directive
95/46/EC (General Data Protection Regulation) [2016] OJ L119/1 (‘GDPR’).
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processing itself, implement appropriate technical and organisational measures […] in an
effective manner and to integrate the necessary safeguards into the processing in order to
meet the requirements of this Regulation and protect the rights of data subjects.’ The
combination of technical and organisational measures is also mandated as part of the
‘security of processing’ duty under Article 32 in order ‘to ensure a level of security appro-
priate to the risk’. Yet, despite the shared ‘by design’ phraseology between the GDPR and
the Secure by Design initiative, there seems to be a misalignment between the two fields
when it comes to the actual meaning of ‘by design’. The three GDPR provisions cited
above have all clearly envisaged technical and organisations measures as effective
ways to comply with data protection principles. As regards the UK government’s
Secure by Design approach, however, it is defined as ‘[a] design-stage focus on ensuring
that security is in-built within consumer IoT products and connected services’.27 This over-
whelming focus on the technical design is also evident in the Code of Practice and the
subsequent regulatory proposals. It is unclear what the organisational dimensions are
in the development of consumer IoT products, how much these aspects matter in mana-
ging cybersecurity risks, and whether the disregard of these aspects will warrant regulat-
ory intervention. All these questions form an important part of what motivates the inquiry
of this paper.
2.3 The role of IoT vendors and the barriers they are facing
There is a rich body of literature on cybersecurity management within commercial organis-
ations. Plenty of researchhas been devoted to combating cybercrimes on the technical front,
including the common threats organisations are facing,28 the technological challenges in
addressing those threats29 and strategies to mitigate such challenges.30 More recently,
research has also focused on the human factors in managing cybersecurity risks for organis-
ations of various sizes. Oltramari et al., for example, underline the importance of addressing
cybersecurity as a socio-technical system: ‘untangling the complexity of cyber security does
not solely depend on pinning down the computational elements into play, but demands a
thorough analysis of the human factors involved.’31 They have identified the defender,
27DCMS, ‘Secure by Design: Improving the cyber security of consumer Internet of Things Report’ (n 14) 33.
28Jibran Saleem and others, ‘A state of the art survey - Impact of cyber attacks on SME’s’ (Proceedings of the International
Conference on Future Networks and Distributed Systems, Cambridge, UK, 2017); Wiem Tounsi and Helmo Rais, ‘A survey
on technical threat intelligence in the age of sophisticated cyber attacks’ (2018) 72 Computer & Security; Mario Spremić
and Alen Šimunic, ‘Cyber Security Challenges in Digital Economy’ (Proceedings of the World Congress on Engineering,
London, 4–6 July 2018).
29Victoria Stanciu and Andrei Tinca, ‘Exploring cybercrime – realities and challenges’ (2017) 16(4) Accounting and Man-
agement Information Systems; Savino Dambra, Leyla Bilge and Davide Balzarotti, ‘SoK: Cyber Insurance – Technical
Challenges and a System Security Roadmap’ (2020 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy (SP) 2020); Vinko Zlomislić,
Krešimir Fertalj and Vlado Sruk, ‘Denial of service attacks, defences and research challenges’ (2017) 20(1) Cluster
Computing.
30Antonio Clim, ‘Cyber Security Beyond the Industry 4.0 Era. A Short Review on a Few Technological Promises’ (2019) 23
Informatica Economică; Christos Tselios, George Tsolis and Manos Athanatos, ‘A Comprehensive Technical Survey of
Contemporary Cybersecurity Products and Solutions’ (ESORICS 2019 International Workshops, IOSec, MSTEC, and
FINSEC, Luxembourg, 26–27 September 2019); Leong Chan and others, ‘Survey of AI in Cybersecurity for Information
Technology Management’ (2019 IEEE Technology & Engineering Management Conference (TEMSCON), Atlanta, 12–14
June 2019).
31A. Oltramari and others, ‘Towards a Human Factors Ontology for Cyber Security’ (2016) <https://stids.c4i.gmu.edu/
papers/STIDS_2015_T04_Oltramari_etal.pdf> accessed 10 May 2021. See also Alex Vieane and others, ‘Addressing
Human Factors Gaps in Cyber Defense’ (Proceedings of the Human Factors and Ergonomics Society Annual Meeting
2016).
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user and attacker as themain actors andmappedout a range of internal and external charac-
teristics affecting cybersecurity risk assessment. Van Zadelhoff went even as far as to
comment that ‘the biggest cybersecurity threats are inside your company’.32 Work by
Bowen et al. focuses on larger organisations,33 whereas Bada and Nurse’s work puts
forward strategies intended for SMEs.34 Similarly, Norval et al. found that start-ups were par-
ticularly fearful about fines and liabilities arising from security vulnerabilities and that whilst
cyber-attacks are a major concern for IoT firms, that use of major platforms gave start-ups
reassurance e.g. for use of their authentication systems.35 Across the board, Sirur et al. ident-
ified disparities among organisations with varying sizes around access to resources in their
reactions to compliancewith theGDPR.36 A 2020 reviewby theUKgovernment has surveyed
the common barriers faced by organisations managing cybersecurity risks, identifying the
inabilities preventing them from taking actions, the lack of commercial rationale to invest
in security, and the complex and insecure digital environment.37
In the context of domestic IoT, there are discussions on the role of human actors, who
might turn out as the source of cybersecurity threats or vulnerabilities as much as who
might fall victims to such threats. As Leukfeldt and Yar argue,38 routine activity theory
(RAT)39 can be a valuable tool in managing cybercrime by understanding the nature of
motivated offenders, suitability of targets and capability of guardians to mitigate cyber-
crimes. Piasecki et al. draw on this analytical framework to understand how to manage
human and technical threats associated with smart home technologies, examining not
just threats from outside the home but also from within.40 From a risk management
point of view, human factors in smart homes can manifest around issues such as usabil-
ity,41 awareness,42 skills,43 resources44 andmotivation.45 These factors all impact the effec-
tiveness of the users’ efforts in self-managing security risks in their smart homes.
32Marc Van Zadelhoff, ‘The Biggest Cybersecurity Threats Are Inside Your Company’ (2016) <https://hbr.org/2016/09/the-
biggest-cybersecurity-threats-are-inside-your-company> accessed 10 May 2021.
33Brian M. Bowen, Ramaswamy Devarajan and Salvatore Stolfo, ‘Measuring the human factor of cyber security’ (2011 IEEE
International Conference on Technologies for Homeland Security (HST), Waltham, 15–17 November 2011).
34Maria Bada and Jason R.C. Nurse, ‘Developing cybersecurity education and awareness programmes for small- and
medium-sized enterprises (SMEs)’ (2019) 27(3) Information and Computer Security 393.
35ibid.
36Sean Sirur, Jason R.C. Nurse and Helena Webb, ‘Are We There Yet? Understanding the Challenges Faced in Complying
with the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR)’ (Proceedings of the 2nd International Workshop on Multimedia
Privacy and Security, Toronto, 15–19 October 2018).




38Eric Rutger Leukfeldt and Majid Yar, ‘Applying Routine Activity Theory to Cybercrime: A Theoretical and Empirical Analy-
sis’ (2016) 37(3) Deviant Behavior 263.
39Lawrence E. Cohen and Marcus Felson, ‘Social Change and Crime Rate Trends: A Routine Activity Approach’ (1979) 44(4)
American Sociological Review 588.
40Stanislaw Piasecki, Lachlan Urquhart and Derek McAuley, ‘Defence Against Dark Artefacts: An Analysis of the Assumptions
Underpinning Smart Home Cybersecurity Standards’ (2019) <https://ssrn.com/abstract=3463799> accessed 10 May 2021.
41Simon Parkin and others, ‘Usability analysis of shared device ecosystem security: informing support for survivors of IoT-
facilitated tech-abuse’ (Proceedings of the New Security Paradigms Workshop, San Carlos, 23–26 September 2019).
42Mookyu Park, Haengrok Oh and Kyungho Lee, ‘Security Risk Measurement for Information Leakage in IoT-Based Smart
Homes from a Situational Awareness Perspective’ (2019) 19(9) Sensors 2148.
43Nan Zhang and others, ‘Understanding and Mitigating the Security Risks of Voice-Controlled Third-Party Skills on
Amazon Alexa and Google Home’ (2018) <https://arxiv.org/abs/1805.01525> accessed 10 May 2021.
44Huichen Lin and Neil W. Bergmann, ‘IoT Privacy and Security Challenges for Smart Home Environments’ (2016) 7(3)
Information 44.
45A. A. Zaidan and B. B. Zaidan, ‘A review on intelligent process for smart home applications based on IoT: coherent tax-
onomy, motivation, open challenges, and recommendations’ (2020) 53(1) Artificial Intelligence Review 141.
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To sum up, the literature addresses the socio-technical aspects of cybersecurity man-
agement mainly from two aspects: How businesses manage threats to their own organis-
ations, and how end-users manage threats to their own homes. We argue that what
is missing is the socio-technical dynamics involved in businesses supporting end-users to
manage threats. This is especially critical in the context of domestic IoT because the
control over the functioning of smart devices is distributed across commercial and dom-
estic actors. From a data protection perspective, for example, Chen et al. have discussed
the legal complexities involved in complying with data protection law in a smart home
setting.46 The development and operation of domestic IoT products often involves a mul-
titude of players, including architectural developers, third-party component builders,
device manufacturers, and end-users. They all exercise some degree of control over
how the system functions, but in starkly different ways. The legal consequence of this
phenomenon, in light of the European Court of Justice’s jurisprudence, is that end-
users and IoT vendors (including manufacturers and service providers) are likely to be
held jointly responsible for the processing of personal data by smart devices. Yet, it is
unclear how the responsibilities should be allocated in practice to duly reflect their
respective control, calling into question whether and how ’domestic data controllers’
should be treated differently from commercial controllers, given their weaker position
in the market and their lack of necessary skills and resources to manage cybersecurity
effectively.47 This also raises the question as to how IoT businesses can support end-
users to fulfil their data protection duties and to prevent cybersecurity threats, which
may arguably form part of those businesses’ accountability duty.
In a perfect market where transaction costs, information asymmetries and externalities
are negligible, the involved parties would in theory come to an agreement whereby the
best-positioned party – to whom the costs would be minimum – would take actions to
minimise cybersecurity risks and get compensated by other parties. In reality, however,
we are seeing a large amount of insecure, unsafe IoT products being sold to consumers.
The question then is, what is stopping organisations from developing products that
come with usable security? As discussed above, there is a gap in the literature on the
socio-technical factors affecting an organisation’s ability to support end-users to
manage cybersecurity. In this study, we focus on the technical, legal and organisational
barriers to a bigger role played by IoT vendors in securing the smart home products
they offer.
3. Methodology
In our study, semi-structured interviews have been carried out, by one single interviewer,
during a period between August and December 2019 with 13 participants.48 These were
dominantly with experts from backgrounds within the fields of the internet of things and
cybersecurity from across civil society, government, industry and legal sectors. The first
46Jiahong Chen and others, ‘Who Is Responsible for Data Processing in Smart Homes? Reconsidering Joint Controllership
and the Household Exemption’ (2020) 10(4) International Data Privacy Law 279.
47Lachlan Urquhart and Jiahong Chen, ‘On the Principle of Accountability: Challenges for Smart Homes & Cybersecurity’
(2020) <https://arxiv.org/abs/2006.11043> accessed 10 May 2021; Heleen Janssen and others, ‘Decentralized Data Pro-
cessing: Personal Data Stores and the GDPR’ (2020) 10(4) International Data Privacy Law 356.
48This study was approved by the Research Ethics Committee of School of Computer Science, University of Nottingham
(reference: CS-2018-R54).
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wave of interviewees were recruited through gatekeepers and our professional network
of contacts, followed by a second wave through snowball sampling. In terms of back-
ground for the different organisations interviewed, this included civil society groups pro-
moting responsible technology development; governmental agencies working on
cybersecurity; and legal services specialising in technology law. All participants had
worked in or with at least one organisation developing IoT products or providing IoT ser-
vices. For ethical considerations, the names of the participants or their organisations are
not disclosed. Instead, they will are quoted with a list of pseudonyms below, combined
with some non-identifying background information. To further assist with anonymity,
the presumed gender of the pseudonym does not necessarily correspond to the
gender identity of the participant. Key themes in our interview questions included: the
interface between regulation and design for smart home cybersecurity; definitional
issues of what constitutes a smart home and the main security risks in the industry; com-
pliance strategies and structures within organisations to support secure smart device
development; priority areas of law, standards and regulatory frameworks; best practice
around regulating devices once in the marketplace; and the role of technical vs legal sol-
utions to dealing with smart cybersecurity vulnerabilities. All interviews were audio-
recorded (between 25 and 60 min), with the names and other direct identifiers of the par-
ticipants removed from the recording before transcription. Coding was carried out with
an inductive method, with one researcher first coding 7 transcripts and the other
researcher 6 transcripts. The two researchers then discussed their code books and inte-
grate them into one. With the new code book, both researchers re-coded the transcripts
they initially coded, and then reviewed each other’s coding, adding additional annota-
tions. This coding method was intended to avoid the dominance of the interpretation
by one researcher and to allow collaborative coverage of all transcripts. By the time of
publication of this article, all recordings have been permanently deleted in line with
the study’s ethical approval.





Role Domain of expertise
1 Alice Civil society 4 Senior policy advisor IoT security
2 Bob Civil society 25 Technology programme
manager
Security and privacy
3 Charlie Civil society 25 Legal counsel Corporate service
4 David Government Unspecified Researcher Cybersecurity
5 Erin Government 4 Researcher Cybersecurity, software
development
6 Frank Government Unspecified Researcher IoT security
7 Grace Industry 23 Cybersecurity professional Cybersecurity
8 Heidi Industry 40 CTO Communications, security
9 Ivan Civil society 10 Legal counsel Corporate service
10 Judy Industry 3 Technical lead IoT
11 Mallory Industry Unspecified CTO Digital services
12 Mike Legal service Unspecified Managing director Corporate service
13 Niaj Civil society 9 Policy director Privacy, surveillance
49Wikipedia, ‘Alice and Bob’ (2021) <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Alice_and_Bob> accessed 10 May 2021.
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4. Findings
As mentioned above, our study focuses on the technical, legal and organisational dimen-
sions of businesses providing IoT products with regard to how these factors affect the
way they make their products secure and support users to improve security. This taxon-
omy finds support in recent work by Veale and Brown, who have reviewed the interdis-
ciplinary literature on cybersecurity, and have identified three main areas of
cybersecurity research: ‘technical aspects’, ‘human factors and social sciences’ and
‘legal dimensions’.50 In what follows, we present the findings from the interviews
around these three themes, each addressing the threat landscape, barriers and solutions
regarding that aspect.
4.1 Technical aspects
Interviewees pointed out different types of threats insecure IoT devices might pose. For
consumers, the threats identified concern the use of data and the safety of users. As gov-
ernment researcher Frank noted, ‘there always have been risks if they had a computer in
their house, but now the threat profile and the footprint of the house now is going to get
larger.’ Privacy was a commonly shared concern among interviewees but the angles are
slightly different. Civil society legal counsel Charlie gave the example of unauthorised
observation via compromised cameras (and so did legal counsel Ivan and law firm mana-
ging director Mike): ‘If they could break into the security of my wireless network, they could
turn on a camera and observe things in my house that I wouldn’t want observed.’ At the
same time, Charlie also raise the point about over-collection of personal data and the
monetisation thereof, something shared by technology programme manager Bob and
CTO Mallory, with different examples. Bob commented: ‘That [IoT] data can be very inva-
sive. And it’s often combined with data from other companies or other devices to form a very
explicit picture of the user that can then be sold.’
Potential harms to the physical safety of the users were also mentioned by intervie-
wees. Ivan, technical lead Judy and Mike all gave their hypothetical examples how
smart devices can be weaponised to inflict harms to the users.
For example, if you compromise someone’s heating, that will - on its own it doesn’t sound like a
big deal because you could just turn it down but then there’s the elderly, which may not be able
to turn down their heating or turn up their heating. So, in winter, or the summer, that could actu-
ally be potentially lethal. (Judy)
Identity theft was another threat picked up by legal counsels Charlie and Ivan. This is
related to another point regarding breaches of confidentiality, which could be an even
bigger issue if the compromised device has been connected to a workplace network
from one’s home (senior policy advisor Alice and Ivan).
From a wider, infrastructural perspective, many interviewees (Alice, Frank, Ivan and
Mallory) shared the concern about vulnerable devices being exploited for carrying out
large-scale cyberattacks, with the Mirai botnet expressly mentioned by some intervie-
wees. Frank noted that:
50Michael Veale and Ian Brown, ‘Cybersecurity’ (2020) 9(4) Internet Policy Review 1.
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I think from the UK point of view, if we’re talking about the nation, what our main concern is, is
that a class of devices is affected which has a massive scaling impact on the UK. So if one person’s
machine or one person’s device is taken down, yes, that one person is very annoyed, but we can
deal with that. If somehow somebody affects all of one manufacturer’s devices and they’re
popular in the UK that could have a massive impact on the UK economy and also UK trust
and stuff like that.
As regards what is causing these vulnerabilities, bad practices in the technical design of
the product were considered a major barrier to securing smart home products:
‘I think, inherently in some cases, it’s things like the lack of interface or the low powered devices,
but also because of bad practices in things like companies setting default passwords, not provid-
ing security for payments and things like that.’ (Policy director Niaj)
Another major technical challenge is how to avoid giving users warnings too often (Bob),
some of which could even be false positives (CTO Heidi). The desensitisation of security
alerts calls for further research into mechanisms to keep users informed but not
overwhelmed.
In terms of available technical solutions to some of the challenges above, Alice and
cybersecurity professional Grace explicitly mentioned Manufacturer Usage Description
(MUD) as a promising approach. MUD is the formal specifications of the intended
purpose of an IoT device, which enables its network behaviour to be monitored and
restricted.51 Developed as a standard to be implemented on terminal devices,52 which
form the ‘edge’ of the IoT, MUD also signifies an important part of the wider develop-
ments in edge-computing technologies, aiming to shift the computing activities closer
to the edge, such as data processing and security management. Mallory pointed out
edge computing could also be a helpful paradigm by minimising the risks associated
with data transfers to the cloud:
‘So the classic example is if you put a camera into someone’s home and you then stream that raw
data in whatever format you’ve got a massive security problem. If you start to incorporate some
edge computing into that and then you can say, what does the camera need to know? All I need
to know is whether there is someone in this room or not or whether it’s just a cat moving around,
yeah?’
The promise of edge-computing will be further discussed below in the ‘discussion and
recommendations’ section.
4.2. Legal aspects
Apart from technical barriers, interviewees also reported major legal reasons why IoT
vendors were not making all necessary efforts to ensure their products were secure.
One common theme picked up by most interviewees was the fact that competing stan-
dards existed, making compliance with some or all of these standards more difficult. Such
divergence in legal or normative standards could be a harmonisation issue, or a jurisdic-
tional one.
51Ayyoob Hamza and others, ‘Clear as MUD: Generating, Validating and Applying IoT Behavioral Profiles’ (2018 Workshop
on IoT Security and Privacy, Budapest, 20 August 2018).
52IETF, ‘Manufacturer Usage Description Specification’ (2019) <https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc8520> accessed
10 May 2021.
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The harmonisation issue arises when the guidance provided by different standard-
setting bodies are inconsistent. Government researcher Erin summarised the issue as
follows (which was similarly also mentioned by Alice):
‘But there’s been an absolute mountain of competing sets of guidance really. Which means it’s
very difficult for somebody implementing something to know which to pick. If you’re a start-up,
you don’t want to have that long lag where you’re just trying to understand the regulatory
environment and which guidance to follow, it can mean the difference between your
company succeeding and failing.’
Perhaps the even more challenging issue is the jurisdictional one, where different
countries may have their own standards, and vendors selling products to more than
one country would have to decide whether to apply the strictest rules to their products
sold to all the markets they trade, or to tailor the products to country-specific regimes.
Bob captures the essence of the issue at hand as:
‘The certification programmes that they develop will not be mandatory for any of the EU member
states. They will be an option. Anyone in an EU member state can choose to do anything or
nothing with it. They can look at it and shrug their shoulders and say, not interested, move
along. Or they can go all the way to the other extreme and make it mandatory to do business
within a particular country.’
Charlie and Frank also reported similar observations.
Interviewees have also pointed out other limitations of the current regulatory frame-
work as being one-size-fits-all, lagging behind reality, lacking baseline requirements
and reliant on private enforcement, as the set of quotes below highlight:
‘And just because it’s a small IoT device doesn’t make it anything special, you’ll need to comply
with the rules.’ (Frank)
‘It’s just been a bit slow because these things are already in people’s houses, but legislation is
always lax, it’s behind technology.’ (Ivan)
‘My concern is that there isn’t a regulatory framework in place to require compliance with many
of these things because why does your protocol need to be secure? You can still sell your product.
No-one’s going to know about it for, you know, a year, two years, and then you realise it’s being
used in a botnet or something and then you try and fix it later on.’ (Ivan)
‘I also don’t think it’s realistic to expect consumers to reinforce security law, or any other law,
because let’s face it, most people hate lawyers.’ (Mike)
In the light of these legal barriers, interviewees made various suggestions on how these
challenges can be at least partly addressed. Laying down uniformed, practical guidelines
or standards seemed to be the most popular idea, shared by Alice, Grace, Ivan and Niaj.
Despite the difference in the exact preferred terms, all those four interviewees seemed to
be supportive of something that can be summarised by Alice as:
‘So we work with a coalition of governments that is working really hard to come up with best
practices and kind of – I don’t want to say standards, but I guess frameworks and baselines
for security.’
Further regulation was also called for, including suggestions of a labelling or certification
scheme (Alice, Grace and Ivan) or introducing a legally binding code of practice as
12 J. CHEN AND L. URQUHART
proposed by the government (Frank). However, respondents showed divergent attitudes
towards the effectiveness of engaging consumers by providing additional, accessible
information. When discussing labelling schemes as a possible solution, for example,
Grace expressed a degree of optimism while Mike was more sceptical (but interestingly,
both picking up on the analogy of food safety regulation):
‘So I don’t think we just don’t provide consumers with enough information at the present moment
in time, if you think about it, you know, to bring a food analogy which is often used in this space,
we know what’s in our food packaging, we know what the breakdown of calories is, we know all
these pieces from the external of the box but when it comes to IT equipment, white box.’ (Grace)
‘[Asked about the role of consumers:] No more so than I think it’s appropriate for consumers to
buy food from a supermarket and be responsible for checking it’s fit for consumption. You talk to
your average consumer, they will not have a clue about security of internet connected devices.
We’ve just about got to a point where consumers know to look for a padlock in the URL bar
of a browser. They don’t know what it means.’ (Mike)
In the discussion section below, we will further elaborate the possibility of expanding the
scope of cybersecurity laws to cover smart devices, before exploring the arguably more
market-friendly labelling and certification mechanisms.
4.3. Organisational aspects
To unpack the internal dynamics within an IoT vendor and their impact on the security of
the consumer IoT products, the interviewees were asked questions about decision-
making and product development across various departments within a typical organis-
ation. A number of such organisational factors seem to have negatively impacted the
security strategisation regarding their products.
First, misalignment of departmental priorities seems to be a major concern. Although,
as Grace noted, in theory security should be a shared object across the entire organisation
if its value for the organisation was properly understood, many interviewees reported
that, in reality, the goals of the design/development department can come into conflict
with those of the compliance/legal department. This is not helped by potential miscom-
munications between departments:
‘Yeah, my principle observation would be in many cases they don’t speak the same language. And
they have a very hard time communicatingwith each other. People often are not translating geek to
English, or between technical and business environments. I think that’s a real problem. People that
are trained in the compliance and legal sphere don’t – some of themmay have a very deep technical
understanding background, many of them don’t. And likewise people that are very deep in the tech-
nology space often have a limited understanding of the legal and compliance issues.’ (Bob)
‘I really think that there is a lack of communication a lot of time between technologists and
business people. Not just for IoT but for everything. Where it can be really difficult for an engineer
to go to someone who has no technical background and say, you are not clearing these risks that
may not appear for five or ten years, and who are in a business position to accept those risks as
something so urgent that they have to delay a product or delay a profit on their – or a return on
their investment even.’ (Alice)
Similar comments were made by Ivan, Judy andMike. Such misalignment andmiscommu-
nications seem to have led to another related barrier: A corporate culture that treats
security compliance very much as an afterthought, as highlighted by both Bob and Mike.
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‘I think too often companies design products and services and view privacy and security and com-
pliance issues as something they can doas anafterthought at the endof a process, it clearly doesn’t
– it needs to be part of a very – from the very start of the design process, all the way through, while
the product or service is in use in the field, all the way through to end of life. Because it never works
well if you view it as a bolt on that you can throw on at the end.’ (Bob)
‘What you sometimes find is that cybersecurity and privacy are a bit of an afterthought, which is
we’ve built this product, now can you tell me what I need to do to comply with data protection
law, and then you’ve really lost the opportunity of saying, well go right back to the beginning,
could you build it in a better way.’ (Mike)
If short-term profitability becomes the top priority of an organisation, the objective of
developing and manufacturing secure products might come across as an unjustified
cost, especially considering the costs of longitudinal support. Mallory noted that:
‘I don’t think that the original manufacturing costs of the product are the problem, I think it’s the
support that’s given from that point onwards isn’t it? I mean I think in a changing security
environment, if a business, the cost of business is going to be supporting the lifetime of that
product rather than its manufacturing, so I don’t think the cheapest of products in the first
instance has really got that much to do with it.’
Ivan and Niaj had similar observations specifically in relation to SMEs. Many of them
simply do not have the luxury to plan for long-term security management for their pro-
ducts, nor do they have specialised teams to offer legal advice. Driven by the need to
survive as a start-up, many smaller IoT vendors have gone for the higher-risk decisions.
In this regard, perhaps a culture change would be what is most needed to heighten the
overall level of smart product security for the entire economy. Thiswas suggested byGrace:
‘First and foremost I think that the nature of that culture comes from the realisation that security
can be an inhibitor, and if you realise that you can build security in it makes security no longer an
inhibitor, so therefore it becomes an accelerator or an enabler.’
In terms of managerial structure and product development cycle, suggestions were made
about deeper cross-department integration early on in the design process. Heidi
suggested that product designs should be subject to ongoing review ‘by an appropriately
experienced and knowledgeable set of personnel’. On the other hand, Heidi also suggested
designers should be involved in some of the early compliance decision-making:
‘Engineers specialise in technology, lawyers specialise in law, there are perhaps technical
measures that technical personnel can identify or develop that might satisfy the needs for regu-
lations like GDPR that perhaps lawyers aren’t aware of. So in that sense I think technical person-
nel can assist a legal department in determining what is appropriate for an organisation in terms
of protect measures for regulations like GDPR.’
Other potential organisational solutions include investment in training and a vulnerability
management team (Grace) or developing tools to support data protection by design
(Niaj). In our further discussion below, we will reflect in greater detail on the implications
of organisational aspects of cybersecurity.
5. Discussion and recommendations
Building on the findings presented in the previous section and also examined against dis-
cussions in the literature and the ongoing regulatory initiatives, we now turn to further
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conceptualisation of the technical, legal and organisational barriers to
improve cybersecurity management in smart homes. We do this to point towards possible
ways forward. It should however be noted that, whilst we present these as distinct tech-
nical, legal and organisational considerations, in practice these are not isolated matters
but are rather interrelated and overlapping issues. The resolution of the issues in one
of those aspects may also likely help address the other two aspects and therefore, tackling
all three sets of issues may maximise the regulatory efficacy. For example, an effective,
holistic approach to securing devices along the supply chain, as hinted in the ENISA
report discussed below, involves endeavours from all those dimensions.
5.1 Technical approaches to security management
5.1.1 Role of edge computing for smart home security
Vendors of IoT products have more power to implement security safeguards at different
stages in the IoT supply chain and lifecycle and should not push responsibilities to end-
users. Nevertheless, with smart homes we increasingly see responsibility for security being
pushed to citizens (particularly so-called domestic data controllers introduced above,53
who may have data protection obligations when operating smart devices in the home).
This can bring security obligations under Article 32 GDPR too,54 for example implement-
ing technical and organisational safeguards to mitigate risks to personal data. There is an
emerging role for security management tools for the end-user as another key component
in supply chain security and managing large scale threats. As such, we are seeing the
development of domestic edge-based IoT security management solutions, with commer-
cial offerings and research prototypes55 including IoT Inspector,56 Fingbox,57 CUJO AI,58 IoT
Sentinel,59 Aretha,60 Homesnitch,61 Sense,62 and DADA.63
The approaches vary for these tools but some example approaches include combi-
nations of: analysing and reporting on security of device firmware (IoT Inspector); monitor-
ing network activity for security vulnerabilities and then acting by blocking intruders/
unknown devices (Fingbox) or isolating devices and notifying users (IoT Sentinel); classify-
ing device behaviour and network traffic to contextualise what it means to users about
data flows (Homesnitch); training users in smart firewall management and curating black-
lists (Aretha); comparing real world IoT device behaviour with manufacturer usage
description (MUD) profiles (DADA); adapting to emerging threats from new sources
(Sentry).
53Urquhart and Chen (n 47).
54Chen and others (n 46).
55Urquhart and Chen (n 47) 16-17.
56IoT Inspector, ‘IoT Inspector’ (2021) <https://www.iot-inspector.com/> accessed 10 May 2021.
57Fingbox, ‘Fingbox’ (2021) <https://www.fing.com/products/fingbox> accessed 10 May 2021.
58CUJO AI, ‘CUJO AI’ (2021) <https://cujo.com/> accessed 10 May 2021.
59Markus Miettinen and others, ‘IoT Sentinel: Automated Device-Type Identification for Security Enforcement in IoT’
(2016) <https://arxiv.org/abs/1611.04880> accessed 13 June 2020.
60William Seymour and others, ‘Informing the Design of Privacy-Empowering Tools for the Connected Home’ (2020)
<https://arxiv.org/abs/2001.09077> accessed 13 June 2020.
61TJ OConnor and others, HomeSnitch: behavior transparency and control for smart home IoT devices (2019).
62F-Secure, ‘F-Secure SENSE’ (2020) <https://www.f-secure.com/gb-en/home/products/sense> accessed 13 June 2020.
63Horizon, ‘Defence Against Dark Artefacts’ (2021) <https://www.horizon.ac.uk/project/defence-against-dark-artefacts/>
accessed 9 December 2019.
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5.1.2 Human-centred security management approaches
Whilst these technical solutions have appeal by moving security management to the edge
of the network in novel ways, more proximate to the end-user, it is worth recalling these
need to be situated within the socio-technical context of the home. To do this, we briefly
reflect on a couple of studies which highlight the risk management, control, and usability
dimensions of managing domestic IoT security in practice.
Zeng et al. have observed that users were particularly concerned about the physical
security of IoT devices64 as did Geeng and Roesner who found users had concerns for
safety too, particularly around home co-occupants being able to use IoT resources
despite the lack of expertise or account control.65 This was particularly concerning for
users when devices stopped working, e.g. in DIY smart homes.
Zeng et al. also found the levels of technical knowledge users have impacted their
awareness of the types of IoT vulnerabilities that exist.66 For example, skilled users
were concerned about encrypted communication channels (HTTPS) but less skilled
users focused on weak passwords or unsecured Wi-Fi. They also noted that this level
of knowledge shaped how users managed risks from IoT. This ranged from changing
behaviour through simple approaches like avoiding speaking in front of the Amazon
Alexa smart speaker through to more skilled approaches like creating separate Wi-Fi net-
works or blocking traffic. Relatedly, Jakobi et al. note the level of information users seek
whilst managing smart homes differs over time.67 At the beginning there is a desire for
more granular information and feedback on current and past behaviour of devices. As
time passed, this reduced to wanting information when systems are ‘not working,
needed their attention, or required active maintenance’.
Geeng and Roesner explored how interpersonal tensions in a home can impact discus-
sions of control over domestic smart technologies.68 They found that partners can dis-
agree about third party access via door lock code (e.g. cleaners); roommates can
disagree on who controls room temperature via IoT apps; and parents and children can
compete for control of an Amazon Echo e.g. with music it plays.
In meeting needs of different users around control, Zeng et al. argue that systems
should ‘support multiple distinct user accounts, usability and discoverability of features
are critical for secondary, less technical users’ e.g. using physical controls and indicators
in the home for when being recorded like switching on or off.69 Similarly, Geeng and
Roesner argue that designers need to be sensitive to different relationship types in
homes and consider how to make the account creation reflect multiple occupancy with
shared devices. They suggest IoT designers need to incorporate ‘mechanical switches
and controls’ for basic device functionality.70
64Eric Zeng, Shrirang Mare and Franziska Roesner, ‘End user security & privacy concerns with smart homes’ (Proceedings
of the Thirteenth USENIX Conference on Usable Privacy and Security, Santa Clara, 12–14 July 2017).
65Christine Geeng and Franziska Roesner, ‘Who’s In Control? Interactions In Multi-User Smart Homes’ (Proceedings of the
2019 CHI Conference on Human Factors in Computing Systems, Glasgow, 4–9 May 2019).
66Zeng, Mare and Roesner (n 64) 71.
67Timo Jakobi and others, ‘Evolving Needs in IoT Control and Accountability: A Longitudinal Study on Smart Home Intel-
ligibility’ (2018) 2(4) Proceedings of the ACM on Interactive, Mobile, Wearable and Ubiquitous Technologies 171.
68Geeng and Roesner (n 65) 6.
69Zeng, Mare and Roesner (n 64).
70Geeng and Roesner (n 65) 6.
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These studies help us consider how to reconcile the promise of edge-based security
approaches with realities of a domestic IoT deployment context. The practical socio-tech-
nical tensions of automating security management in usable ways requires not just to
focus on issues like interface design, or longitudinal device management but also more
socially fundamental issues around how systems can work for all occupants, not just tech-
nically skilled ones and reflect on strategies for managing impacts on social relations in
the home.
5.2 A legal framework supporting co-management of threats
5.2.1 Acknowledging smart homes as a cybersecurity frontline
Domestic IoT, like many digital services, involves a complex supply chain of vendors, oper-
ators, suppliers and third parties. As our participants suggested, where the responsibility
for dealing with potential large scale IoT security risks lies needs unpacking. We now con-
sider shifting policies on how responsibility for security considerations is managed across
the IoT supply chain and life cycle. This involves examining changes in critical national
infrastructure security regulation through proposed revisions to the NIS Directive.71
As discussed above, the current NIS Directive focuses on organisations involved in criti-
cal national infrastructure with a set of essential and digital services defined within its
remit (e.g. cloud computing). It foregrounds the importance of mutual support and col-
laboration between them to establish and mitigate risks, alongside notification pro-
cedures for incidents and implementing safeguards.72 Emerging reforms in the NIS 2.0
proposal from December 2020 seek to broaden the scope of the legislation to different
bodies, to capture the wider range of actors that need to consider security manage-
ment.73 It would apply to both essential (Annex 1) and important (Annex 2) entities
that are not ‘micro or small enterprises’. Certain organisations in the Annexes can be
subject to the Directive regardless of size, in a range of circumstances74 e.g. where
they provide trust, Top Level Domain, or Domain Name Service utilities, are public elec-
tronic communications networks or are the sole provider of a service in the member state.
Whilst the list of essential providers mirror those in the current NIS legislation, includ-
ing transport, energy, banking, financial markets, health, and water distribution, the list of
digital infrastructure services would become broader. It would include data centres,
content delivery, DNS and TLD name registries, exchange points, and providers of
public electronic communications networks. Interestingly, in addition to providers of
online marketplaces, online search engines and social networking platforms, the manu-
facturers of computer, electronic, electrical and optical products would now be included
as important entities also subject to NIS obligations under the proposal.75 In part, this
71Commission (EC), ‘Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on measures for a high
common level of cybersecurity across the Union, repealing Directive (EU) 2016/1148’ COM(2020) 823 final, 16 December
2020 (‘NIS 2.0 Proposal’).
72Lachlan Urquhart and Derek McAuley, ‘Avoiding the internet of insecure industrial things’ (2018) 34(3) Computer Law &
Security Review 450.
73NIS 2.0 Proposal, art 2.
74ibid art 2(2).
75See section C division 26 of NACE Rev 2 for the full long list (computer, electronic and optical) and Division 27 (electrical
equipment) (Eurostat, ‘NACE Rev. 2: Statistical classification of economic activities in the European Community’ (2008)
<https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/documents/3859598/5902521/KS-RA-07-015-EN.PDF> accessed 10 May 2021.) This also
includes other manufacturers of transport equipment, machinery etc.
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recognises growing security obligations that need attention as industry 4.0 and smart
manufacturing emerge, but it also shows the complexity of ensuring security across
supply chains. Even since 2016 (when the original NIS Directive was passed), the entities
which have responsibilities for critical national infrastructure needs to be more broadly
construed.
It also highlights the importance of managing security across the supply chain. For
example, as part of developing EU cybersecurity certification schemes76 for products, ser-
vices and processes to demonstrate compliance with requirements for technical and
organisational measures being deployed within an organisation, it includes a focus on
supply chain security as one measure.77 NIS 2.0 proposes that this includes ‘security-
related aspects concerning the relationships between each entity and its suppliers or
service providers such as providers of data storage and processing services or managed secur-
ity services.’78 It also states there need to be EU coordinated security risk assessments
involving ENISA and the Commission for critical supply chains.79
It brings some measures which will help both establish and manage responsibilities to
minimise scope for large scale infrastructural vulnerabilities. This includes new vulner-
ability disclosure approaches. As the proposed legislation states in Article 6 (1), Member
states will coordinate a vulnerability disclosure scheme, where the Member State
CSIRT80 operate this, cooperating with other CSIRTs in relation to notified vulnerabilities.
This is in conjunction with an ENISA-run EU wide registry which includes: ‘information
describing the vulnerability, the affected ICT product or ICT services and the severity of the
vulnerability in terms of the circumstances under which it may be exploited, the availability
of related patches and, in the absence of available patches, guidance addressed to users of
vulnerable products and services as to how the risks resulting from disclosed vulnerabilities
may be mitigated.’81 Given the lucrative trade in zero-day vulnerabilities and stockpiling
of these by security agencies, cybercriminals and nation states, this disclosure strategy
may have significant gaps in coverage but at least it showcases a new approach to coor-
dinating responses to vulnerabilities (e.g. beyond ad hoc ethical vulnerability disclosure
processes).82 This is a key measure, where vendors play a role in reporting vulnerabilities
so these can be patched and risks of large-scale impacts can be avoided.
Concurrently to the NIS 2.0 proposals, ENISA has been establishing new approaches to
thinking about security across IoT supply chains. Their recent report from December 2020
highlights several priorities for ensuring responsibilities are well managed.83 This looks
across the IoT supply chain, from conceptual to development to production to utilisation,
support and retirement stages. For the purposes of this discussion, we highlight 3




80Computer Security Incident Response Team (e.g., in UK, the National CSIRT is the National Cybersecurity Centre, but
there are numerous other private sector and governmental CSIRTs. For a full list, see ENISA, ‘CSIRTs by Country - Inter-
active Map’ (2021) <https://www.enisa.europa.eu/topics/csirts-in-europe/csirt-inventory/certs-by-country-interactive-
map#country=United%20Kingdom> accessed 10 May 2021).
81NIS 2.0 Proposal, art 6(2).
82Alana Maurushat, Disclosure of Security Vulnerabilities (Springer 2013).
83ENISA, ‘Guidelines for Securing the Internet of Things’ (2020) <https://www.enisa.europa.eu/publications/guidelines-
for-securing-the-internet-of-things> accessed 10 May 2021.
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elements that pertain to addressing critical infrastructural security risks, particularly in the
latter stages once IoT is deployed in use.
Firstly, with the ‘end user operation and service provision’, ENISA highlight the impor-
tance of elements such as:
. provision of management and technical support resources to ensure security across
the IoT device lifecycle;
. ensuring compromises in user experience and convenience are balanced against secur-
ity approaches;
. ensuring that IoT operators have training to guard against risks from misuse or
misconfiguration;
. use of access controls; seeking to increase uptake of security measures.
Secondly, in ongoing technical support and maintenance, they primarily highlight the
importance of providing over the air, secure maintenance tools, and patching. This is
another key area of concern in the UK proposals, as mentioned above, particularly
vendors specifying for how long they will provide update support. Thirdly, this raises
the importance of data removal for end of life with devices. Whilst many of these pro-
visions are drafted with organisations and business users in mind,84 as we
have discussed throughout, domestic operators of IoT devices increasingly have obli-
gations around data processing, and thus these strategies demonstrate the importance
of not pushing all responsibilities just to end-users, but that ongoing security support
from vendors is critical. The nature of support vendors of IoT products and services
need to provide is not well defined, but the ENISA guidance shows possible directions
for this, to mitigate risks posed by domestic IoT being managed purely by end users
(as part of the IoT supply chain).
5.2.2 Certification and labelling mechanisms
A common theme picked up by the respondents was the difficulty in complying with
inconsistent standards issued by different bodies and applied in different countries.
Fully resolving this issue would ultimately entail harmonisation of different standards.
In practice, sector- and country-specific efforts can help mitigate this issue for IoT
vendors, especially SMEs who do not necessarily have the resources to cope with multiple
standards. This is where certification schemes may come into play, as suggested by some
interviewees and also in work by Piasecki et al.85 A certification body approved by the
competent regulator – which can be a sector-specific one – may compile the applicable
legal requirements and cybersecurity standards, and turn them into a set of practical,
demonstrable and verifiable guidelines tailored to the sector concerned.
There are international certification schemes already in place designed to evaluate the
security level of ICT systems. One of the most prominent schemes is Common Criteria (CC,
also known as ISO 14508), which built largely on the European standard ITSEC developed
84ENISA Report states its scope on p7 in s1.2 as ‘all the stages of the IoT supply chain, defined as a holistic system of
organizations, people, technology, processes, information, and other physical and virtual resources involved in the
whole lifespan of any IoT product or service, from the conception to the end customer supply and the end of the
product life cycle.’
85Piasecki, Urquhart and McAuley (n 40).
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by the UK, Germany, France and the Netherlands in 1991.86 There have been sugges-
tions,87 and indeed practices,88 in certifying IoT devices with CC, but the number of con-
sumer products on the list of CC-certified products remains minimal. CC is also subject to
criticisms as to its suitability for the IoT sector. Baldini et al., for example, point out that the
time and costs involved in the process to acquire a CC certificate are hard to justify in the
fast-developing IoT market.89 Also, the chosen CC protection profile does not always
match the needs of the user, and may even conflict with other devices put into the
same system.90 More importantly, Matheu et al. highlight the challenge that version-
specific schemes, such as CC, would be incompatible with the common industrial practice
of updating or patching IoT products on a regular basis.91
In the UK, the National Cyber Security Centre (NCSC) has stopped issuing CC certificates
since October 2019.92 The NCSC offers alternative certification services,93 but the only one
targeting consumer products is Commercial Product Assurance (CPA), which only covers
smart metering products.94 In this regard, there might be scope for a more targeted, gov-
ernment- or industry-led security certification schemes designed for domestic IoT pro-
ducts. Given the significant overlap between cybersecurity and data protection
standards, there is also a possibility of alignment, or even integration, between IoT secur-
ity certification schemes with data protection certification schemes. The GDPR sets out a
voluntary certification scheme and lays down the conditions that the certificates, the cer-
tification bodies and the accrediting authorities must meet.95 This approach is viewed as a
‘monitored self-regulation’model by Lachaud, who also calls for further improvements of
the current regime as dictated by the GDPR.96 With specific regard to IoT products in
relation to both security and data protection matters, an effective certification scheme
must address the supply chain issue highlighted above, examining whether consumers
(in a B2C context) or IoT vendors (B2B) would be the more appropriate audience of
such certificates.
A more consumer-facing and arguably lighter-touched alternative to certification is
labelling, sometimes known as ‘self-certification’, as preferred in the UK government’s
initial regulatory proposals,97 albeit entirely turned down at a later stage.98 It should
however be noted that there are significant differences between certification and
86Siv Hilde Houmb and others, ‘Eliciting security requirements and tracing them to design: an integration of Common
Criteria, heuristics, and UMLsec’ (2010) 15(1) Requirements Engineering 63.
87Corneliu Nitu, ‘The Case for Common Criteria Certification of IoT Systems’ (2019) <https://www.linkedin.com/pulse/
case-common-criteria-certification-iot-systems-corneliu-nitu> accessed 10 May 2021.
88Sooyoung Kang and Seungjoo Kim, ‘How to Obtain Common Criteria Certification of Smart TV for Home IoT Security and
Reliability’ (2017) 9(10) Symmetry 233.
89G. Baldini and others, Security certification and labelling in Internet of Things (2016).
90ibid.
91S. N. Matheu, J. L. Hernandez-Ramos and A. F. Skarmeta, ‘Toward a Cybersecurity Certification Framework for the Inter-
net of Things’ (2019) 17(3) IEEE Security & Privacy 66.
92NCSC, ‘Common Criteria’ (2019) <https://www.ncsc.gov.uk/information/common-criteria-0> accessed 10 May 2021.
93NCSC, ‘NCSC certification’ (2021) <https://www.ncsc.gov.uk/section/products-services/ncsc-certification> accessed 10
May 2021.
94NCSC, ‘Commercial Product Assurance (CPA)’ (2021) <https://www.ncsc.gov.uk/information/commercial-product-
assurance-cpa> accessed 10 May 2021.
95GDPR, arts 42, 43.
96Eric Lachaud, ‘The General Data Protection Regulation and the rise of certification as a regulatory instrument’ (2018) 34
(2) Computer Law & Security Review.
97DCMS, ‘Consultation on the Government’s regulatory proposals regarding consumer Internet of Things (IoT) security’ (n
16).
98DCMS, ‘Proposals for regulating consumer smart product cyber security - call for views’ (n 17).
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labelling mechanisms: The labelling scheme proposed by the government is meant to be
a mandatory rather than voluntary regime, meaning that all IoT products must bear a
security label with all the details mandated by law. However, there is no designated cer-
tification body under the labelling scheme, with the devices self-certified by the manufac-
turers and retailers.
The shift of the government’s preferred regulatory option away from the labelling
scheme perhaps resulted from the ‘diverse range of opinions’ received during the consul-
tation.99 Such a disagreement is also evident among our interviewed experts, as reported
above. Echoing the food safety regulation analogy raised by the interviewees, there are
lessons that the design of a labelling scheme can learn from the regulatory experience
in, for instance, mandatory disclosure of food nutrition information. Indeed, work by
Kelley et al.100 and Cranor101 speaks of a ‘privacy nutrition label’, which draws on food
nutrition labelling regimes with a view to informing the design of similarly standardised
labels or icons. It has been empirically proved that privacy notices for IoT products are
poorly accessible, making it hard for consumers to make meaningful use of them.102 As
such, making information available to consumers of IoT products in a truly legible and
usable manner should be a priority for policymakers. Another lesson that can be
learned from the food industry comes from the fact that unsafe and unhealthy food
are regulated differently: The former is prohibited whereas the latter is warned against
through proper disclosure of information. In a similar vein, the UK government’s first
two regulatory options in the Secure by Design regulations – ‘mandating a security
label’ and ‘mandating the top 3 guidelines’ – are not necessarily incompatible with one
another. There is scope for prohibiting consumer IoT products not compliant with the
top 3 guidelines while at the same time requiring vendors to declare the level of compli-
ance with the rest of the guidelines through a standardised format. Further research,
however, will be needed on how this can be implemented in practice.
5.3 The need for organisational strategies
5.3.1 Competing priorities in organisations
Driven by commercial interests, maximising profits is perhaps unsurprisingly a common
objective for most IoT vendors. At the same time, ensuring products are secure and sup-
porting users to manage security can also form part of the organisations’ strategic priori-
ties. These two goals are not always considered fully compatible with each other by all
organisations, many of whom are most likely to prioritise profit over security when
99DCMS, ‘Government response to the Regulatory proposals for consumer Internet of Things (IoT) security consultation’
(2020) <https://www.gov.uk/government/consultations/consultation-on-regulatory-proposals-on-consumer-iot-
security/outcome/government-response-to-the-regulatory-proposals-for-consumer-internet-of-things-iot-security-
consultation> accessed 10 May 2021.
100Patrick Gage Kelley and others, ‘A "nutrition label" for privacy’ (Proceedings of the 5th Symposium on Usable Privacy
and Security, Mountain View, 15–17 July 2009).
101Lorrie Faith Cranor, ‘Necessary But Not Sufficient: Standardized Mechanisms for Privacy Notice and Choice’ (2012) 10
Journal on Telecommunications and High Technology Law 273.
102Niklas Paul and others, ‘Assessing Privacy Policies of Internet of Things Services’ (33rd IFIP TC 11 International Confer-
ence, Poznan, 18–20 September 2018); Alfredo J. Perez, Sherali Zeadally and Jonathan Cochran, ‘A review and an
empirical analysis of privacy policy and notices for consumer Internet of things’ (2018) 1(3) Security and Privacy 1;
Pardis Emami-Naeini and others, ‘Exploring How Privacy and Security Factor into IoT Device Purchase Behavior’ (Pro-
ceedings of the 2019 CHI Conference on Human Factors in Computing Systems, Glasgow, 4–9 May 2019).
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they see them as in conflict. Howmuch an organisation would have the incentive to invest
in security would therefore depend on the extent to which efforts in improving security
can be aligned with the financial sustainability of the organisation.
It has been pointed out by multiple interviewees (Alice, Evan and Mallory) that for SMEs
or start-ups producing low-cost connected gadget, it tends to be harder to find the scope
to internalise the costs of developing secure products as well as maintaining them for the
longer term. Surviving in a relatively competitive market by having their products rolled
out as quickly and inexpensively as possible is regarded as the top priority of many of the
smaller organisations. At the same time, most interviewees also think there should not be
such a misalignment. In the long-term, enhancing IoT product security can be in line with
the commercial interest of the organisation. The absence of appropriate security planning
early on in the development process can cause great costs to organisations, including
costs to fix or even recall insecure products, reputational, and trust damage among con-
sumers and within the supply chain, and in serious cases, direct financial losses due to
consumer claims or fines imposed by regulators.
Such competing priorities also manifest in how different departments communicate
and work together within the organisation. As highlighted in our findings above, many
interviewees reported observations of compliance being an after-thought and often
dealt with solely by the legal department. With security and data protection largely
seen as compliance requirements to be dealt with mainly by the legal department,
product development often does not involve the legal department early on. The develop-
ment department may have some understanding of what is required by law or technical
standards, their performance is measured mainly by the feasibility, marketability and
profitability of the product design. Even if the legal department is involved, the language
barriers between the two departments sometimes prove to be too hard to overcome.
Meaningful engagement with a view to enhancing compliance with product security
requirements across the organisation remains a significant challenge.
In this regard, a change of corporate culture in how the security of products should be
treated as a priority, as suggested by interviewees, would make a difference. To make this
change happen, strong leadership from executive management would be critical. As Heidi
pointed out, the conflict of priorities between departments is ‘more a culture thing and
more a management style’. Promoting effective inter-department communications and
collaborations across the IoT sector is thus not only a matter of improving organisational
governance internally, but can significantly heighten the overall level of security of IoT
products, which in turn improves cybersecurity for individual consumers as well as the
wider network.
5.3.2 Organisational structure matters
One point discussed with regard to the regulatory landscape above was the different con-
notations of the ‘by design’ terminology in adjacent regulatory spaces. While the concept
of ‘data protection by design’ upheld in Article 25 of the GDPR emphasises both organ-
isational and technical measures, the ‘secure by design’ approach in IoT cybersecurity
focuses solely on the technical aspect. In the context of regulating AI – something com-
parable to IoT with both being data-driven technologies – there have already been discus-
sions on how management structure of firms developing AI solutions can impact the
effectiveness of accountable AI policies. The EU’s White Paper on AI, for example, had
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proposed ‘setting up a broad-based public private partnership, and securing the commit-
ment of the top management of companies’.103 The UK ICO’s draft AI Auditing Framework
also has a strong focus on the governance structure of organisations, explicitly suggesting
that important decisions regarding AI risk management cannot be delegated to data
scientists or engineering teams but should be address directly by the senior manage-
ment.104 More specifically, it was suggested that:
‘To do so, in addition to their own upskilling, they need diverse, well-resourced, teams to support
them in discharging their responsibilities. You also need to align your internal structures, roles
and responsibilities maps, training requirements, policies and incentives to your overall AI gov-
ernance and risk management strategy.’105
In contrast, the Secure by Design initiative has largely overlooked these important organ-
isational dimensions in the recommended practices. None of the 13 guidelines in the
Code of Practice for Consumer IoT Security addresses how to improve corporate structure
to support implementation of the technical requirements. The same lack of coverage on
organisational considerations is seen also in the ETSI Technical Specification on Cyber
Security for Consumer Internet of Things. Only more recently, as discussed above,
ENISA addressed the issues surrounding the supply chain and recommended a range
of good practices for security of IoT, which does cover the ‘people’ aspect, including sug-
gestions addressing ‘training and awareness’, ‘roles and privileges’ and ‘security
culture’.106 These recommendations, however, are yet to be translated into the UK’s regu-
latory practices.
Such a renewed understanding of ‘secure by design’ should be translated into policy-
making. Rather than viewing organisations as black boxes, policymakers should begin
thinking about how to unpack the internal workings of organisations developing and
operating IoT products and services. This includes considering how engagements, rec-
ommendations and even interventions could facilitate organisations to secure their
smart products, and how to support consumers to secure their smart homes. This
should also form part of the wider paradigmatic shift to the human-centred security
approach to regulating consumer IoT product, as highlighted by Piasecki.107
6. Conclusion
Our study with 13 experts from industry, civil society and government stakeholders sheds
light on the socio-technical challenges facing the consumer IoT sector, specifically focus-
ing on the technical, legal and organisation aspects. The findings show that IoT vendors,
especially SMEs, experience major obstacles on those three dimensions, leading us to
further reflect on what is lacking in the current regulatory environment and what is
103Commission (EC), ‘White Paper on Artificial Intelligence - A European approach to excellence and trust’ (2020) 7
<https://ec.europa.eu/info/sites/default/files/commission-white-paper-artificial-intelligence-feb2020_en.pdf>
accessed 10 May 2021.




106ENISA, ‘Good Practices for Security of IoT - Secure Software Development Lifecycle’ (2019) 51–52 <https://www.enisa.
europa.eu/publications/good-practices-for-security-of-iot-1> accessed 10 May 2021.
107Piasecki, Urquhart and McAuley (n 40).
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needed to support and incentivise manufacturers and retailers to not just make their con-
sumer IoT products more secure, but also to make the security of their products genuinely
manageable by average end-users. Some of the challenges are interrelated, which can
make the coping strategies more complex, but at the same time, could also mean that
a holistic approach may be possible and necessary. The ongoing regulatory efforts in
the UK are overlooking some of those socio-technical factors, which could potentially
undermine the efficacy of such initiatives. We believe there is need to prioritise the follow-
ing approaches to redress this, including: adopting a human-centred approach to security
across the IoT supply chain from organisations to homes; ensuring vendors develop tech-
nical and organisational support structures that attend to the growing role of domestic
data controllers in managing smart home security; expanding the scope of cybersecurity
laws to forecast and manage risks across the lifecycle of IoT devices, alongside improving
capacity to responsively collaborate to tackle emerging IoT risks; rolling out certification
and labelling schemes that increase consumer trust in devices; and promoting security-
minded organisational structures. We believe policymakers and industry should give
due regard to these elements in order to better secure the smart home.
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